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BUSINESS AND CORPORATE LAW
Richard T. Horan, Jr.*
Thomas E. Repke**
I. INTRODUCTION
This article reviews recent developments in the law affecting
Virginia businesses and corporations. Part II discusses recent judi-
cial decisions in Virginia courts involving businesses and corpora-
tions. Part III discusses several acts of the 1993 session of the Vir-
ginia General Assembly that amend Virginia's corporate,
partnership, limited liability company and securities act statutes.
II. RECENT JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Shareholder Liability for Acting as Directors
In Curley v. Dahigren Chrysler-Plymouth, Dodge, Inc.,1 the Su-
preme Court of Virginia held that a claim of unlawful distribution
of corporate assets under the Virginia Stock Corporation Act
(Stock Corporation Act) could be maintained against the share-
holders of a closely held corporation where such shareholders ac-
tively conducted the business of the corporation and failed to ob-
serve corporate formalities.2
Edward R. Curley, Jr. (Curley) and two other individuals incor-
porated Dahlgren Chrysler-Plymouth, Dodge, Inc. (the dealership)
and through it purchased an automobile dealer franchise.3 Chrysler
Credit Corporation (Chrysler Credit) financed the dealership's
purchase of new and used automotive inventory, parts and equip-
ment.4 As part of the financing, Curley and the two other share-
* Associate, Hogan & Hartson, McLean, Virginia; B.S., 1984, James Madison University;
J.D., 1987, University of Virginia.
** Associate, Hogan & Hartson, McLean, Virginia; B.A., 1987, The College of William
and Mary; J.D., 1990, University of Virginia.
1. 245 Va. 429, 429 S.E.2d 221 (1993).
2. Id. at 434, 429 S.E.2d at 224.
3. Id. at 431, 429 S.E.2d at 222.
4. Id.
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holders, along with their spouses entered an agreement guarantee-
ing dealership's indebtedness to Chrysler Credit.5
Subsequently, Motors Holding Company, Inc. (Motors Holding)
and certain officers of Motors Holdings purchased all of the out-
standing stock in the dealership and began actively participating in
the operation of the dealership. At no time, however, did the new
shareholders hold corporate meetings or elect corporate directors
for the dealership.6
The dealership then sent Chrysler Credit three checks that were
returned for insufficient funds and, pursuant to a court order,
Chrysler Credit repossessed its collateral from the dealership and
obtained a judgment against Curley, the other two original share-
holders, and their spouses (collectively, the Curley Parties) for the
dealership's unsatisfied indebtedness to Chrysler Credit.7
The Curley Parties filed an action against the dealership and
each of its shareholders alleging, among other things, that the de-
fendants distributed assets of the dealership at a time when the
defendants knew that the dealership could not pay its debts, and,
therefore, that such distributions violated the Stock Corporation
Act.8 The trial court ruled that under section 13.1-692(A) of the
Stock Corporation Act, such an action may only be brought against
duly elected directors of the corporation and none of the defend-
ants was a director.9
Under the Stock Corporation Act, the board of directors of a
corporation "may authorize the corporation to make distributions
to its shareholders unless, after such distribution, the corporation
'would not be able to pay its debts as they become due in the usual
course of business.' ,,o Section 13.1-692(A) of the Stock Corpora-
tion Act provides that a director may be liable to the corporation
and to its creditors under certain circumstances if such director
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 432, 429 S.E.2d at 222-23. The specific violations were: (1) distributions to share-
holders which would make the corporation unable to pay its debts as they become due
(§ 13.1-653); (2) general standards of conduct for directors (§ 13.1-690); and (3) director
liability for unlawful distributions to shareholders (§ 13.01-692).
9. Id. at 433, 429 S.E.2d at 223.
10. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-653 (Repl. Vol. 1993).
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votes for or assents to a distribution made in violation of section
13.1-653.1
In reversing the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia held that because the defendant shareholders ran the dealer-
ship on a daily basis, made acquisition and sale decisions and en-
cumbered the corporation with debt, the shareholders assumed the
roles of directors and officers of the corporation.12 As such, "the
shareholders assumed not only the authority and fiduciary respon-
sibilities of directors, but also the liabilities resulting from the ex-
ercise of such roles."' 3 Consequently, the court ruled that the
shareholders were "directors" for purposes of sections 13.1-653, -
690 and -692 of the Stock Corporation Act and remanded the case
for further proceedings.' 4
The court explained that shareholders of a closely held corpora-
tion who ignore corporate formalities do so at their own peril:
"Shareholders, such as these, who comprise all the shareholders in
the corporation, cannot escape liability by failing to observe the
formality of electing directors when they exercise all the powers
and undertake all the activities of directors."' 5
B. Piercing the Corporate Veil and Personal Liability for the
Obligations of a Corporation
The doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil" was examined in
two decisions during the past year, one from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and another from the Cir-
cuit Court of Fairfax County.
In Perpetual Real Estate Services, Inc. v. Michaelson Proper-
ties, Inc.,' 6 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that
Virginia law requires that to pierce the corporate veil and hold a
shareholder liable for the obligations of the corporation, in addi-
tion to proving that the corporation is the alter ego of the share-
holder, the plaintiff must also establish that the corporation was a
11. Id. A director found liable is entitled to seek contribution from the shareholders re-
ceiving the improperly distributed assets. Id.
12. Id. at 434, 429 S.E.2d at 224.
13. Id. at 434, 429 S.E.2d at 224 (citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306, 309 (1939)).
14. Id. at 434, 429 S.E.2d at 224.
15. Id. (citing Coastal Pharmaceutical Co. v. Goldman, 213 Va. 831, 836, 195 S.E.2d 848,
852 (1973); Moore v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 155 Va. 556, 570, 155 S.E.2d 707, 711
(1930)).
16. 974 F.2d 545 (4th Cir. 1992).
19931 633
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"device or sham used to disguise wrongs, obscure fraud or conceal
crime. ,17
Aaron Michaelson (Michaelson) incorporated Michaelson
Properties, Inc. (MPI), under the laws of the state of Illinois for
the purpose of entering into real estate joint ventures. Michaelson
was the president and sole shareholder of MPI. MPI subsequently
entered into two joint ventures with Perpetual Real Estate Ser-
vices, Inc. (PRES), to convert apartment buildings into condomini-
ums. One such joint venture involved the formation of Arlington
Apartment Associates (AAA), with PRES and MPI each contribut-
ing $50,000 and agreeing to share liabilities pro rata. AAA subse-
quently made various distributions of the profits from the condo-
minium units. Prior to each distribution, the partners made a
determination, as required by the partnership agreement, that the
partners were leaving sufficient assets to permit the partnership to
meet its anticipated expenses. MPI then authorized distributions
of its profits to Michaelson."'
Subsequently, several condominium purchasers filed breach of
warranty claims against AAA in the amount of five and one-half
million dollars. The suit was settled pursuant to a settlement
agreement under which PRES paid $950,000 to the plaintiffs on
behalf of the partnership. MPI made no contributions toward the
settlement, because all of the profits that MPI had earned from its
real estate ventures had been distributed to Michaelson.19
PRES then filed a diversity action in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against Michaelson and
MPI seeking recovery from MPI for a pro rata share of the settle-
ment. PRES sought, inter alia, to hold Michaelson personally lia-
ble for MPI's debt on the theory that MPI was Michaelson's "alter
ego or mere instrumentality" and that MPI's corporate veil should
be pierced. 20 The jury found in favor of PRES and Michaelson ap-
pealed, arguing that the district court's instruction to the jury on
piercing the corporate veil misstated Virginia law.21 The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed, reversing the jury verdict
17. Id. at 549.
18. Id. at 546-47.
19. Id. at 544.
20. Id.
21. Id.
634 [Vol. 27:631
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and remanding the case with instructions that judgment be en-
tered for Michaelson.22
The court of appeals emphasized that only in extraordinary
cases have Virginia courts disregarded the corporate form and held
some or all of the shareholders personally liable for the debts of
the corporation.23 "[A] fundamental purpose of incorporation is to
'enable a group of persons to limit their liability in a joint venture
to the extent of their contributions to the capital stock.' ,124 "This
concept of limited liability 'supports a vital economic policy,' 25 ...
a policy on which 'large undertakings are rested, vast enterprises
are launched, and huge sums of capital attracted.' "26
Under Virginia law, a plaintiff bears the burden of convincing
the court to disregard the corporate form, and must first establish
"'that the corporate entity was the alter ego, alias, stooge, or
dummy of the individuals sought to be charged personally.' ",27
This element may be established by evidence that the defendant
exercised "'undue domination and control' over the corporation. '2
The court ruled that under this element of the test, the district
court properly permitted the jury to consider evidence of whether
the defendant observed corporate formalities, maintained corpo-
rate records, paid dividends, and whether the corporation had
other officers or directors.29
The court emphasized, however, that in addition to the forego-
ing, "something more than mere domination or control by a share-
holder is required to induce the court to disregard the entity of a
corporation."30 The plaintiff must also establish "that the corpora-
tion was a device or sham used to disguise wrongs, obscure fraud,
or conceal crime. '3 1
22. Id. at 549.
23. Id. at 548 (citing Cheatle v. Rudd's Swimming Pool Supply Co., 234 Va. 207, 212, 360
S.E.2d 828, 831 (1987); Beale v. Kappa Alpha Order, 192 Va. 382, 397, 64 S.E.2d 789, 797
(1951)).
24. Id. (quoting Beale, 192 Va. at 395, 64 S.E.2d at 796).
25. Id. (quoting Cheatle, 243 Va. at 212, 360 S.E.2d at 831).
26. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944)).
27. Id. (quoting Cheatle, 234 Va. at 212, 360 S.E.2d at 831).
28. Id. (quoting Beale, 192 Va. at 396, 64 S.E.2d at 797).
29. Id.
30. Id. (quoting Beale, 192 Va. at 396, 64 S.E.2d at 797).
31. Id. (quoting Cheatle, 234 Va. at 212, 360 S.E.2d at 831; Lewis Trucking Corp. v. Com-
monwealth, 207 Va. 23, 31, 147 S.E.2d 747, 753 (1966)).
1993] 635
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In reversing the district court, the court of appeals held that the
jury instruction, which permitted the imposition of personal liabil-
ity on Michaelson if it was found that Michaelson dominated MPI
and used the corporation to perpetrate an "'injustice or funda-
mental unfairness,'" failed to communicate the rigorous standard
of proof required in Virginia that the defendant use the corpora-
tion to "disguise" some legal "wrong. '3 2 In reaching its conclusion,
the court emphasized that the parties had entered into a contrac-
tual relationship, and that courts have been extraordinarily reluc-
tant to lift the veil in contract cases "where the 'creditor has will-
ingly transacted business' with the corporation."33
In PC-Expanders, Inc. v. Subsystem Technologies,4 the Fairfax
County Circuit Court held that no private cause of action could be
maintained against an officer of an undomesticated foreign corpo-
ration doing business in Virginia. 5 The action in PC-Expanders
arose out of a sale by PC-Expanders, Inc. of certain computer mer-
chandise to Subsystem Technologies, Inc. (STI), a Maryland cor-
poration. At the time of such sale, STI did not have a certificate of
authority to transact business in Virginia, as required by section
13.1-757(A) of the Stock Corporation Act.36 As such, plaintiff ar-
gued that during the period of time that STI transacted business
in Virginia without a certificate of authority, STI had no legal exis-
tence in Virginia, and, accordingly, liability should accrue to the
sole known principal of STI, Samir Mehra (Mehra), the chief exec-
utive officer. The defendants argued that plaintiff failed to state a
cause of action against Mehra individually.
The court observed that since the repeal of former section 13.1-
119, the Stock Corporation Act no longer expressly imposes indi-
vidual civil liability on the agents of an undomesticated foreign
corporation transacting business in Virginia.3 7 While the Stock
Corporation Act does specify the consequences of transacting busi-
ness in Virginia without authority, it does not include among the
consequences the imposition of individual civil liability to private
parties pursuant to a private cause of action.3 8 Rather, the statute
32. Id. at 548-49.
33. Id. at 550 (quoting United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 693 (5th Cir.
1985)).
34. 28 Va. Cir. 231 (Fairfax County 1992).
35. Id. at 235.
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-757(A) (Repl. Vol. 1993).
37. PC-Expanders, 28 Va. Cir. at 233.
38. Id. at 234.
[Vol. 27:631636
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provides that "each officer, director and employee who does any
such business in this Commonwealth knowing that a certificate of'
authority is required shall be liable for a penalty of not less than
$500 and not more than $5,000."'s
The court interpreted the legislative intent behind the repeal of
former section 13.1-119 combined with the enactment of the cur-
rent statute to hold that the Virginia General Assembly intended
to eliminate the imposition of personal liability on the officers of a
foreign corporation that fails to obtain a certificate of authority to
transact business in Virginia.4 °
C. Suits by Partners Against Co-Partners and Their
Partnerships
Several cases during the past year addressed the issue of
whether a partner in a Virginia partnership may bring an action at
law against a co-partner or the partnership prior to the dissolution
of the partnership.
In Dulles Corner Properties II Ltd. Partnership v. Smith,41 the
Supreme Court of Virginia held that a general partner in a limited
partnership may not bring an action at law for breach of fiduciary
duty against another general partner until the partnership has
been dissolved and a final accounting made.42 The court reiterated
the general rule of Virginia partnership law that "an action at law
by one partner against his co-partners will not lie on a claim grow-
ing out of the partnership transactions until the business is wound
up and the accounts finally settled. 4
3
The fact that the partnership was a limited partnership did not
affect the court's analysis. The court held "that [sections 50-73.1 to
-73.77] of the [RULPA], manifest a clear legislative intent to pro-
vide general partners of a limited partnership no more rights
against each other than those of any partner in a partnership
formed pursuant to common law and the [UPA] .... 44
Therefore, the court concluded, the plaintiff was required to ob-
tain a dissolution and accounting of the partnership prior to as-
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-758(D) (Repl. VoL 1993).
40. PC-Expanders, 28 Va. Cir. at 234-35.
41. 246 Va. 153, 431 S.E.2d 309 (1993).
42. Id. at 155, 431 S.E.2d at 311.
43. Id. (quoting Summerson v. Donovan, 110 Va. 657, 658-59, 66 S.E.2d 822, 822 (1910)).
44. Id. at 156, 431 S.E.2d at 311.
1993]
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serting the breach of fiduciary duty claim against the co-general
partner.45
Interestingly enough, several months prior to the Dulles Corner
Properties decision, the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond in
Kumar v. Metropolitan Hospital L.P.,46 held that the general pro-
hibition against suits brought by partners against their partner-
ships prior to dissolution does not apply to suits brought by lim-
ited partners against limited partnerships. 47
While making rounds at a hospital, the plaintiff, a medical doc-
tor, slipped on some stairs, fell and was injured. The plaintiff sued
the owners of the hospital claiming that his fall resulted from the
negligence of agents and employees of the hospital. The hospital
was owned by Metropolitan Hospital, L.P., a Virginia limited part-
nership, of which the plaintiff was a limited partner.48 The hospital
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that a partner can-
not sue his partnership for negligence arising out of partnership
business.
The circuit court denied the hospital's motion for summary
judgment holding that the general prohibition in Virginia against a
partner maintaining an action at law against the partnership has
no application to limited partners.49 In making the distinction, the
court gave two reasons for the general prohibition against suits by
partners of a general partnership.50 First, every partner in a gen-
eral partnership has a voice in the conduct of the business and,
therefore, when one partner alleges wrongful conduct against the
partnership, such partner is actually alleging wrongful conduct
against himself.51 Second, each partner in a general partnership is
liable for the debts of the partnership and, therefore, a judgment
obtained by one partner against the partnership would constitute a
judgment against himself.52
45. Id.
46. 7 V.L.W. 1059, 1075 (Richmond City Cir. Ct. Feb. 25, 1993).
47. Id.
48. Amerihealth Systems of Virginia, Inc., the corporate general partner of the partner-
ship, was also named as a defendant.
49. Kumar, 7 V.L.W. at 1075.
50. Id.
51. Id. (citing Quillen v. Titus, 172 Va. 523, 531, 2 S.E.2d 284, 287 (1939); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 50.18(e) (Repl. Vol. 1989)).
52. Kumar, 7 V.L.W. at 1075 (citing Holloway v. Smith, 197 Va. 334, 340, 88 S.E.2d 909,
915 (1955); VA. CODE ANN. § 50-15 (Repl. Vol. 1989)).
638 [Vol. 27:631
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Unlike general partners, limited partners do not have an equal
voice with general partners controlling the management and con-
duct of the business of the limited partnership, and limited part-
ners are generally not liable for the debts of the partnership in
excess of their capital contributions.5 Thus, the court reasoned, a
limited partner who alleges wrongful conduct on the part of the
partnership does not allege wrongful conduct on his part because
he is not presumed to have had an equal role in such conduct.5 By
the same token, a limited partner who obtains a judgment against
the partnership would not obtain a judgment against himself be-
cause the limited partner is not liable for partnership debts. 5
The couit observed that a limited partner is no different in these
regards from a stockholder in a corporation and "there has never
been any prohibition against a person maintaining a negligence ac-
tion to recover for personal injuries against a corporation in which
such person owns stock. The court can think of no logical reason to
deny a limited partner the same right."56
The court also rejected the hospital's argument that the suit was
precluded by section 50-13 of the UPA which in general provides
that partners are liable for losses or injuries caused by the partner-
ship to anyone but a partner.5 Section 50-6 of the UPA, however,
provides that the UPA "shall apply to limited partnerships except
insofar as the statutes relating to such partnerships are inconsis-
tent herewith." 58  Because under the RULPA limited partners are
generally not liable for partnership debts, section 50-13 of the UPA
53. Kumar, 7 V.L.W. at 1075 (quoting section 50-73.24(A) of the RULPA which provides,
in pertinent part:
Except as provided in subsection D of this section, a limited partner is not liable for
the obligations of a limited partnership unless he is also a general partner or, in addi-
tion to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he participates in
the control of the business....
VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.24(A) (Repl. Vol. 1989 & Cum. Supp. 1993)).
54. Kumar, 7 V.L.W. at 1075.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.; see § 50-13 of the UPA which provides that
[w]here, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course
of the business of the partnership, or with the authority of his copartners, loss or
injury is caused to any person, not being a partner in the partnership, or any penalty
is incurred, the partnership is liable therefor to the same extent as the partner so
acting or omitting to act.
VA. CODE ANN. § 50-13 (RepL Vol. 1989).
58. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-6 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
1993] 639
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is inconsistent with the law applicable to limited partnerships and,
the court reasoned, is therefore inapplicable.""
In IMWA Equities IX Co. Limited Partnership v. WBC Associ-
ates Limited Partnership," the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit held that under Virginia common law a partner
could enforce an indemnity provision in an amendment to a part-
nership agreement prior to the partnership's dissolution, winding
up and final accounting.61
IMWA Equities IX Company, L.P., a New Jersey limited part-
nership (IMWA) and WBC Associates Limited Partnership, a Vir-
ginia limited partnership (WBC), were two of three partners in
Beacon Hill Farm Associates II Limited Partnership, a Virginia
limited partnership (Beacon Hill), formed to acquire and develop a
2000-acre tract of land in Loudoun County, Virginia. James M.
Wordsworth (Wordsworth) and Harvey C. Borkin (Borkin) were
the general partners of WBC. Porten Sullivan Corporation, a Ma-
ryland corporation (PSC), was Beacon Hill's third partner and was
both the sole general partner and a limited partner.6 2
In connection with the development of the Loudoun County
property, Beacon Hill admitted IMWA as a limited partner to pro-
vide additional security to Beacon Hill's lender. IMWA provided a
six million dollar irrevocable letter of credit to the lender as secur-
ity for a five and one-half million dollar loan made to Beacon
Hill.6 3 Beacon Hill's partnership agreement was amended to pro-
vide that any draws against the letter of credit would be treated as
a loan from Beacon Hill to IMWA. Any such loan and all accrued
interest thereon would be payable upon the earlier of the dissolu-
tion of Beacon Hill or one year from the date of the draw against
the letter of credit.6 4
To afford IMWA some protection in the event that Beacon Hill
defaulted on its obligation to pay any such loan, PSC, WBC,
Wordsworth and Borkin agreed to indemnify IMWA for a portion
of any overdue principal and interest on any loan. The amendment
59. Kumar, 7 V.L.W. at 1075.
60. 961 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1992).
61. Id. at 483-84.
62. Id. at 480.
63. Id. at 481.
64. Id.
640 [Vol. 27:631
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to the Beacon Hill's partnership agreement also provided for cross-
indemnification between PSC, WBC, Wordsworth and Borkin .
5
Beacon Hill and PSC filed voluntary petitions under Chapter 11
of the United States Bankruptcy Code. Beacon Hill's lender de-
manded payment on the entire six million dollar letter of credit.
68
IMWA's bank honored such demand, thereby converting the six
million dollar letter of credit into a loan from IMWA to Beacon
Hill. The loan became due and payable to IMWA upon Beacon
Hill's Chapter 11 filing under the terms of the amended partner-
ship agreement. Beacon Hill did not repay the loan and WBC,
Wordsworth and Borkin subsequently refused to indemnify IMWA
for any portion of the loan. EMWA brought an action in federal
district court alleging that WBC and each of Wordsworth and
Borkin, as individuals, were liable for indemnifying IMWA in ac-
cordance with the terms of the Beacon Hill amended partnership
agreement.68 The district court dismissed the action stating that
until the partnership had "been wound up,.., you cannot sue on
these individual obligations."'69
In reversing the decision of the district court, the court of ap-
peals ruled that the indemnity provision in the Beacon Hill part-
nership agreement required WBC, Wordsworth and Borkin to in-
demnify IMWA in accordance with the terms of the partnership
agreement in advance of any dissolution and final accounting for
Beacon Hill.7 0 The court observed that both the Virginia Revised
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA)7 1 and the Virginia
Uniform Partnership Act (UPA)72 were silent on the issue and,
therefore, that Virginia common law would govern.73
Under Virginia common law, "an action at law by one partner
against his co-partners will not lie on a claim growing out of the
partnership transactions until the business partnership is wound
up and the accounts finally settled. '7 4 Nevertheless, "where there
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 482.
68. Id. at 481-82.
69. Id. at 482.
70. Id. at 483.
71. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-73.1 to 50-73.77 (Repl. Vol. 1989 & Cum. Supp. 1993).
72. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-1 to 50-43 (Repl. Vol. 1989 & Cum. Supp. 1993).
73. IMWA, 961 F.2d at 482.
74. Id. at 482 (quoting Summerson v. Donovan, 110 Va. 657, 658-59, 66 S.E. 822, 822
(1910)).
1993]
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is an express stipulation in the partnership articles which is vio-
lated by one partner, an action at law will lie."'7 5
The court concluded that the Beacon Hill partnership agree-
ment, as amended, provided an express stipulation obligating
WBC, Wordsworth and Borkin to indemnify IMWA in advance of
dissolution and final accounting for the Beacon Hill partnership.
6
D. Applicability of Partnership Law to Professional
Corporations
In Boyd, Payne, Gates & Farthing, P.C. v. Payne, Gates, Far-
thing & Radd, P.C.,"7 the Supreme Court of Virginia held that
"[b]ecause [a professional corporation] was a close corporation and
its shareholders validly conducted the internal affairs of their law
practices as a partnership, . . . the trial court properly settled
their rights and liabilities according to partnership law."'78
Boyd involved the breakup of a law firm which had originally
been formed as a partnership but subsequently converted to a pro-
fessional corporation. The law firm filed suit against the departing
members, who had formed a separate professional corporation. The
law firm alleged that its departing members had collected and de-
posited into a segregated interest bearing account monies in pay-
ment of the law firm's receivables. 9 In a cross bill, the departing
members alleged that their former firm had been incorporated as a
"convenience to obtain certain tax and other benefits, but that the
law practice had been conducted as a partnership both before and
after the corporation's formation."80 The departing members asked
that the court order an accounting and that the rights and liabili-
ties of the parties be determined in accordance with the law of
partnership. The law firm argued that it was "a legal impossibility"
for a partnership and a corporation to coexist under these
circumstances.81
The supreme court found that the course of dealing that was fol-
lowed over a period of ten years estopped the professional corpora-
75. Id. at 482-83 (quoting Gilbert v. Fontaine, 22 F.2d 657, 662 (8th Cir. 1927)).
76. Id. at 483.
77. 244 Va. 418, 422 S.E.2d 784 (1992).
78. Id. at 430, 422 S.E.2d at 790.
79. Id. at 420, 422 S.E.2d at 785.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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tion and its members from denying the existence of a partnership
and the legality of the actions taken in that relationship.,2 The
firm was a close corporation and its shareholders validly conducted
the internal affairs of their law practice as a partnership."3 There-
fore, the trial court properly settled their rights and liabilities ac-
cording to partnership law."
E. Applicability of Merger Defense to Partnership Judgments
In Equity Investors, Ltd. v. West,85 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia held that under the RULPA, if a judgment is entered against
a partnership, the judgment creditor can ifie a subsequent action
to enforce the judgment against individual partners who were not
named parties to the initial action. 8
Equity Investors, Ltd., a Virginia general partnership (Equity),
filed a motion for judgment against Super Seven, a Virginia gen-
eral partnership seeking to collect the outstanding balances on six
promissory notes executed by two general partners on behalf of
Super Seven. None of the general partners of Super Seven was
named as defendants in the lawsuit. Equity obtained a judgment
against Super Seven partnership, but the trial court denied Eq-
uity's request to docket the judgment against the individual part-
ners.8 7 Equity then fied a motion for judgment against certain sol-
vent Super Seven general partners. The partners fied demurrers
asserting that Equity's cause of action had merged in the judgment
against the Super Seven partnership.88
The supreme court, reversing the trial court's decision, ruled
that although under Virginia common law a judgment recovered by
a creditor against a partnership would result in the merger of a
cause of action against any of the partners not named in the origi-
nal action, the Virginia General Assembly abolished the merger
doctrine as applied to partners when it enacted section 50-8.1 of
the UPA.8 9 The last sentence of section 50-8.1 provides that a
partnership's "partners shall be liable for judgment and be subject
82. Id. at 425, 422 S.E.2d at 788.
83. Id. at 430, 422 S.E.2d at 790.
84. Id.
85. 245 Va. 87, 425 S.E.2d 803 (1993).
86. Id. at 92, 425 S.E.2d at 806.
87. Id. at 88-89, 425 S.E.2d at 804-05.
88. Id. at 89, 425 S.E.2d at 805.
89. Id. at 91, 425 S.E.2d at 806.
1993] 643
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
to execution to the extent and in the manner provided by law."" °
Therefore, the court reasoned, "[e]ven though Equity Investors'
causes of actions on the notes merged in the judgment it obtained
against Super Seven, the right to enforce the judgment against the
individual partners did not merge." 91
In response to the partners' argument that they should not be
liable for a judgment for which they might not have been notified,
the court stated that "section 50-8.1 of the UPA gives all partners
in a partnership constructive notice that partners 'shall be liable
for judgment and be subject to execution to the extent and in the
manner provided by law.' 92
F. Affiliated Transactions and Fiduciary Duties of Proxy Hold-
ers and Directors
The Fairfax County Circuit Court addressed numerous Virginia
corporate law issues in the context of a transaction between a cor-
poration and a majority shareholder. In Roscigno v. DeVille,93 the
Circuit Court for Fairfax County set aside a transaction where a
corporation's principal asset was sold to an interested shareholder
of the corporation and the corporation was dissolved without a dis-
tribution to the plaintiff-shareholder.9 4
Thomas Roscigno (Roscigno) was a stockholder of T&T Interna-
tional Industries, Inc. (T&T), a Virginia corporation formed for the
purpose of constructing an office building in Herndon, Virginia.15
On July 31, 1987, Roscigno and James A. DeVille (DeVille) en-
tered into an agreement pursuant to which DeVille agreed to fi-
nance Roscigno's purchase of stock from another T&T shareholder
so that Roscigno would become the majority shareholder of T&T.
Roscigno then put his stock in trust and granted his voting rights
with respect to such stock to DeVille by proxy for a period of three
years.96
90. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-8.1 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
91. Equity Investors, 245 Va. at 91, 425 S.E.2d at 806.
92. Id. at 92, 425 S.E.2d at 806.
93. 28 Va. Cir. 96 (Fairfax County 1992).
94. Id. at 104.
95. Id. at 97.
96. Id. at 98. Roscigno also executed a promissory note in favor of DeVille and pledged all
of his T&T stock to Deville as security for payment of the note. The eventual goal of the
arrangement was to effect a 50 percent division of ownership between DeVille and Roscigno
and a 60 percent division of profits, respectively. Id.
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DeVille was to have complete control over the business of T&T
including the construction and resale of the Herndon property.
DeVille and his son became the corporation's officers and directors.
For various reasons, the property was never developed. On Octo-
ber 31, 1989, DeVille sent notice to the T&T shareholders of a
special meeting to be held on November 27, 1989. The stated pur-
pose of the meeting was to vote on the sale of T&T's principal
asset and the dissolution of T&T due to a negative net worth and
negative income. The notice also provided that DeVille would be a
potential purchaser of the asset. Additionally, DeVille prepared a
balance sheet reflecting an indebtedness of the corporation to him
of $534,033.' 7
The shareholders met and passed a resolution, with DeVille vot-
ing Roscigno's stock by proxy and consent by the other sharehold-
ers, approving the sale of T&T's principal asset to a general part-
nership in which DeVille was a partner, and the dissolution of
T&T. Roscigno received no monetary distribution from the sale or
dissolution.98
Roscigno filed suit against DeVille and T&T (1) seeking enforce-
ment of certain statutory rights, including the statutory require-
ments governing notice of shareholders meetings, affiliated transac-
tions and shareholder dissenter's rights, (2) alleging improper use
of proxy and seeking to have the shareholder resolutions voided
and (3) alleging breach of fiduciary obligations by DeVille. ee
The court ruled that the transaction constituted an unautho-
rized affiliated transaction under the Stock Corporation Act.100
With exceptions not applicable to the transaction in Roscigno, sec-
97. Id.
98. Id. Roscigno's attorney was present at the meeting and voiced an objection to the
propriety of the action taken, but did not expressly seek to revoke the proxy previously
given. Id.
99. Id. at 99. The court first held that the notice of the special shareholders' meeting
satisfied the requirements of sections 13.1-724(D) and 13.1-658 of the Stock Corporation Act
even though the notice did not contain a statement that the T&T Board of Directors recom-
mended the transaction. Id. Section 13.1-724(B)(1) of the Act requires that for the board of
directors to "authorize" a sale of substantially all of a corporation's assets as contemplated
under subsection (A), the board must "submit the proposed transaction to the shareholders
with its recommendation," unless the board determines that because of conflicts of interest
or other special circumstances a recommendation should not be made. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-724(B)(1) (Repl. Vol. 1993). The court held, however, that the act does not require
that the notice to the shareholders contain a statement to such effect. Roscigno, 28 Va. Cir.
at 99.
100. Roscigno, 28 Va. Cir. at 100.
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tion 13.1-725.1 of the Stock Corporation Act provides that a corpo-
ration may not engage in an affiliated transaction °1 with an inter-
ested shareholder1 0 2 for a period of three years following such
interested shareholder's determination date, unless the transaction
is approved by the affirmative vote of a majority (but not less than
two) of the disinterested directors and by the affirmative vote of
the holders of two-thirds of the voting shares other than shares
beneficially owned by the interested shareholder.103
The court held that because DeVille was the beneficial owner of
Roscigno's shares by virtue of his proxy rights entitling him to vote
such shares, the transaction by which T&T sold its principal asset
to an entity in which DeVille was a partner constituted an "affili-
ated transaction" under section 13.1-725.1.104 As a result, the
transaction constituted an unauthorized affiliated transaction be-
cause T&T had only two directors, one of whom was DeVille, who
was interested in the transaction.105
In addition, the court found that DeVille breached his fiduciary
duties to Roscigno while acting in his capacity both as a proxy
holder and as an officer and director of T&T.106 As a proxy holder,
the court construed general principles of agency and corporate law
to find that in Virginia a proxy holder is in a fiduciary relationship
with the shareholder to the extent of the matters within the scope
101. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-725.1 (Repl. Vol. 1993). An "affiliated transaction" as defined
in the Stock Corporation Act includes, among other transactions, any sale, except for trans-
actions in the ordinary course of business, to or with any interested shareholder of any
assets of the corporation having an aggregate fair market value in excess of five percent of
the corporation's consolidated net worth, or the dissolution of the corporation if proposed
by or on behalf of an interested shareholder. Id. § 13.1-725 (Repl. Vol. 1993).
102. Id. § 13.1-725.1. An "interested shareholder" is defined as any person that is the
beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any class of the voting shares of the corpora-
tion. Id. § 13.1-725. A person is deemed to be a "beneficial owner" of voting securities as to
which such person has, directly or indirectly through any contract, arrangement, under-
standing, relationship or otherwise, voting powers, including the power to vote or to direct
the voting of voting shares. Id.
103. Id. § 13.1-725.1.
104. Roscigno, 28 Va. Cir. at 100.
105. Id. The court ruled against Roscigno on his argument that he was entitled to dis-
senter's rights since such rights extend only to shareholders who are entitled to vote on the
sale or exchange and Roscigno had no voting rights as a result of the proxy assignment to
DeVille. Id; see VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-730 (Repl. VoL 1993).
106. Id. at 101-03.
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of his agency.107 DeVille, the court ruled, breached his fiduciary
duty by voting the shares which he held as proxy to his benefit."'
As an officer and director of T&T, DeVille had a fiduciary duty
to Roscigno as a shareholder to exercise good faith in his dealings
with T&T and the shareholders. 109 Under Virginia law, a director
of a private corporation may not directly or indirectly, in any
transaction in which he is under a duty to guard the interests of
the corporation, acquire any personal advantage, or make any
profit for himself. If he does so, he may be compelled thereafter to
account to the corporation.110 Although such an affiliated transac-
tion is not necessarily void, it is presumed to be invalid and the
fiduciary bears the burden of proving that the transaction was
valid."'
The court found that DeVille failed to show that he was entitled
to receive the $534,033 from T&T in connection with the sale of its
principal asset. Therefore, DeVille did not meet his burden of
proof to show that the transaction was fair and characterized by
the utmost good faith.11 2
G. Successor Liability for Product Liability Claims
In Taylor v. Atlas Safety Equipment Co.,113 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that a
purchasing corporation in an asset acquisition was not subject to
107. Id. at 102 (citing Allen Realty Corp. v. Holbert, 227 Va. 441, 446, 318 S.E.2d 592, 594
(1984); H-B Partnership v. Wimner, 220 Va. 176, 179, 257 S.E.2d 770, 773 (1979); Mutual
Reserve Fund Ass'n v. Taylor, 99 Va. 208, 219, 37 S.E. 854 (1901)).
108. Id.
109. Id. (citing Giannoti v. Hamway, 239 Va. 14, 24, 387 S.E.2d 725, 730 (1990); Glass v.
Glass, 228 Va. 39, 47, 321 S.E.2d 69, 74 (1984); Adelman v. Conotti Corporation, 215 Va.
782, 789, 213 S.E.2d 774, 778 (1975)).
110. Roscigno, 28 Va. Cir. at 103 (citing Giannotti, 239 Va. at 24, 387 S.E.2d at 725).
111. Roscigno, 28 Va. Cir. at 103 (citing Giannotti, 239 Va. at 24, 387 S.E.2d at 725);
Adelman, 215 Va. at 789, 213 S.E.2d at 778.
112. Roscigno, 28 Va. Cir. at 103. With respect to Roscigno's argument that his proxy was
improperly voted because it was revoked, the court held that although the proxy rights were
revocable because there was no conspicuous statement of irrevocability. Id. at 101. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-663 (Repl. Vol. 1993). The proxy was not properly revoked prior to the
meeting. Id. at 101. Generally, if a proxy remains revocable, it may be revoked by the simple
act of the shareholder of record appearing at the shareholders' meeting and voting or offer-
ing to vote the stock. Id. (citing 18A AML Junm 2D Corporations § 1094 (1993)). Roscigno did
not appear at the meeting, and his attorney, although voicing an opinion as to the propriety
of the action, did not specifically revoke the proxy and was not authorized to vote Ros-
cigno's shares. Id.
113. 808 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Va. 1992).
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successor liability for a tort committed by the selling corporation,
notwithstanding that the purchasing corporation and the selling
corporation had: (1) the same president, address and phone num-
ber (2) many of the same customers; and (3) sold the same
product.114
The plaintiff, injured while working at a construction site in Vir-
ginia after a snap hook assembly he was wearing opened and
caused him to fall,"' brought a product liability action against At-
las Safety Equipment Company, Inc., a New York corporation (At-
las), the snap hook manufacturer, and Atlas' successor corporation,
Gemtor, Inc., a New Jersey corporation (Gemtor). Prior to the date
of the accident, One Johnson Avenue Corporation (JAC), a New
Jersey corporation, acquired, for $25,000 cash, certain of Atlas' as-
sets and trade debts, but specifically did not assume liability for
any pending or future product liability claims against Atlas." 6
JAC's sole shareholder was Atlas' president at the time, Alan Neu-
stater.1 7 Thereafter, Atlas ceased doing business and was eventu-
ally dissolved three years after the date of acquisition." 8
Contemporaneous with the formation of JAC, Neustater formed
Gemtor and became Gemtor's president, sole director and share-
holder." 9 Gemtor subsequently began manufacturing and selling
fall protection equipment, including the product at issue, using
JAC's machinery that had apparently been abandoned.120 Gemtor
hired many of Atlas' former employees pursuant to new employ-
ment agreements, entered into a new lease on the premises for-
merly occupied by Atlas, and assumed Atlas' telephone number.' 2'
Gemtor sold products to some of Atlas' former customers, although
Gemtor did not sell any product stamped with the Atlas name, and
did not fill any orders with Atlas' materials or inventory. 122
As a general rule, a corporation that purchases the assets of an-
other corporation is not liable for the debts and contingent liabili-
114. Id. at 1252.
115. Id. at 1248.
116. Id. at 1249.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. It is unclear from the opinion whether Gemtor contracted directly with either
Atlas or JAC to acquire such assets.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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ties of the selling corporation, including product liability claims. 12 3
Virginia law recognizes four traditional exceptions to the general
rule.124 The court stated:
In order to hold a purchasing corporation liable for the obligations
of the selling corporation, it must appear that (1) the purchasing
corporation expressly or impliedly agreed to assume such liabilities;
(2) the circumstances surrounding the transaction warrant a finding
that there was a consolidation or de facto merger of two corpora-
tions; (3) the purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the
selling corporation; or (4) the transaction is fraudulent in fact.125
The court rejected plaintiffs argument that the transaction con-'
stituted a de facto merger because there was no continuity of own-
ership between Atlas and Gemtor.126 The court stated that al-
though the Supreme Court of Virginia has not squarely addressed
the concept in the area of successor liability, Virginia would likely
adopt the traditional view of the de facto merger exception. 127 The
elements of the exception are (1) a continuity of the selling corpo-
ration's enterprise, including continuity of management, personnel,
physical location, assets, and general business operations, (2) a
continuity of ownership because the purchasing corporation ac-
quires the assets with shares of its own stock, which ultimately are
held by the selling corporation's shareholders, (3) prompt liquida-
tion and dissolution of the selling corporation's business opera-
tions, and (4) an assumption by the purchasing corporation of the
selling corporation's obligations necessary for normal operation of
the seller's business.1 28 The key element of a de facto merger is a
continuity of ownership between the selling and purchasing corpo-
123. Id. at 1250 (citing Bud Antle, Inc. v. Eastern Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 1451, 1456 (11th
Cir. 1985); Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 446 (7th Cir. 1977); Leannais v. Cincinnati,
Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1977); Crawford Harbor Assocs. v. Blake Constr. Co., 661 F.
Supp. 880, 883 (E.D. Va. 1987); 15 WnLui M. FLETCHER, F1ETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 7122, 7123, 7123.05 (Perm. Ed. 1990)).
124. Taylor, 803 F. Supp. at 1250 (citing Harris v. T.I., Inc., 243 Va. 63, 413 S.E.2d 605
(1992)).
125. Id. (quoting Harris, 243 Va. at 70, 413 S.E.2d at 609). The plaintiff did not contend
that Gemtor expressly or inpliedly agreed to assume Atlas' liabilities or that the purchase
of Atlas' assets was fraudulent.
126. Id. at 1251.
127. Id. at 1250 (citing Harris, 243 Va. at 69-72, 413 S.E.2d at 609-10).
128. Id. at 1250-51.
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rations. 29 The Taylor Court held that this essential element was
not present because Gemtor purchased Atlas' assets for cash, no
shareholders of Atlas became shareholders of Gemtor, and because
no shareholders of Gemtor obtained an ownership interest in Atlas
as a result of the transaction.13 0
The court also rejected plaintiff's argument that Gemtor was a
"mere continuation" of Atlas.' Under the traditional view
adopted by Virginia3 2 of whether one corporation is the "mere
continuation" of another, the essential inquiry is whether there has
been a continuation of the corporate entity of the seller, not
whether there has been a continuation of the seller's business oper-
ations.13 3 As the Virginia Supreme Court recently observed in Har-
ris, the "key element" of such inquiry is whether there is "[a] com-
mon identity of the officers, directors, and stockholders in the
selling and purchasing corporations.' 13 4
In rejecting plaintiff's claim that Gemtor was a mere continua-
tion of Atlas under Virginia law, the court found that there was no
identity of ownership between Atlas and Gemtor, except for Neus-
tater, there was no identity of management between Atlas and
Gemtor, and there remained two corporations following the trans-
action as Atlas continued its corporate existence for approximately
three-and-one-half years prior to dissolving.13 5
III. RECENT LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
During the 1993 Session of the Virginia General Assembly,
eleven bills were proposed in the corporation, partnership and lim-
129. Id. (citing Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 1977) ("[a]bsent a
transfer of stock, the nature and consequences of a transaction are not those of a merger.");
Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439-40 (7th Cir. 1977); Crawford Harbor Assocs.
v. Blake Constr. Co., 661 F. Supp. 880, 884 (E.D. Va. 1987) ("[t]he essential characteristic of
a de facto merger is the succession of the selling corporation's stockholders to stockholder
status in the purchasing corporation.")).
130. Taylor, 808 F. Supp. at 1251.
131. Id. at 1252.
132. Id. at 1251 (citing Harris v. T.I., Inc., 243 Va. 63, 69-72, 413 S.E.2d 605, 609-10
(1992).
133. Taylor, 808 F. Supp. at 1251 (citing Bud Antle, Inc. v. Eastern Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d
1451, 1458 (11th Cir. 1985); Travis, 565 F.2d at 447; Crawford Harbor, 661 F. Supp at 885;
Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96, 98 (Minn. 1989)).
134. Taylor, 808 F. Supp. at 1251 (quoting Harris, 243 Va. at 70, 413 S.E.2d at 609).
135. Id.
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ited liability company area. All of these bills were passed and
signed by Governor Wilder.136
A. Distribution of Shareholders' Life Insurance Policy Proceeds
The Stock Corporation Act was amended to change the defini-
tion of "distribution" to exclude a corporation's acquisition of
shares from the estate of a deceased shareholder.137 This exclusion,
however, is effective only to the extent that (1) the corporation
purchases the shares using proceeds of insurance on the deceased
shareholder's life and (2) the board of directors approved the pol-
icy and the redemption terms prior to the shareholder's death.
This legislation was endorsed by the Virginia Bar Association.
Those attorneys who represent small corporations should make
special note of this legislation. Many small closely held corpora-
tions have redemption or buy-out agreements between the corpora-
tion and certain shareholders which provide that upon the death of
a shareholder his or her shares shall be purchased by the corpora-
tion with proceeds from life insurance policies. At the time of the
death of any shareholder, however, the corporation may be prohib-
ited by the solvency requirements of the Stock Corporation Act
from paying to the estate of the deceased shareholder the life in-
surance proceeds as a distribution. Accordingly, if the corporation
and the shareholders desire for this type of payment to be made
and not deemed a distribution, counsel must ensure that the statu-
tory requirements to avoid characterization as a "distribution" in
section 13.1-603 are satisfied. These procedural requirements are
136. The legislation enacted in the corporate, partnership and limited liability company
areas that is not discussed in this article includes the removal of the general restrictions in
Code of Virginia §§ 13.1-308 and 13.1-336 on the use of the word "cooperative" as part of a
corporate or business name for corporations or associations whose purpose is to promote
housing opportunities or to represent, coordinate and further the purposes of groups organ-
ized to construct, operate or promote housing. Act of Mar. 29, 1993, ch. 822, 1993 Va. Acts
822 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-308 and 13.1-366 (Repl. Vol. 1993)).
Also, gas companies and electric companies are authorized to enter into partnership
agreements, joint ventures or other associations where the purposes of such partnerships,
joint ventures or other associations are found by the State Corporation Commission to be in
direct furtherance of such entities certificated business and are otherwise found to be in the
public interest. Act of Mar. 11, 1993, ch. 143, 1993 Va. Acts 143 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-627 (Repl. Vol. 1993)). Under current law, such business arrangements are permitted
only between gas companies or between electric companies.
137. Act of Mar. 15, 1993, ch. 200, 1993 Va. Acts 200 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
603 (Repl. Vol. 1993)).
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designed to prevent abuse of this characterization of life insurance
proceeds.
B. Shareholder Derivative Actions
In the wake of "major additions to, and revisions of, Virginia's
derivative suit statute" in 1992 by the Virginia General Assem-
bly,"' the 1993 Virginia General Assembly changed the recently
enacted statute1 3 9 to amend provisions governing the conduct of
shareholder derivative actions. Under prior law, a court could dis-
miss a shareholder derivative action if the court found, among
other things, (1) that corporate representatives determined that
maintenance of the shareholder derivative action was not in the
best interest of the corporation, and (2) the corporate representa-
tive submitted a short and concise statement of the reasons for the
determination and such determination was not "manifestly unrea-
sonable." The 1993 amendment to the statute eliminates the re-
quirement that the determination not be "manifestly unreasona-
ble."'140 This change makes this statute consistent with the
comparable provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act.'
The General Assembly also enacted two procedural changes to
the derivative action statute, both of which should benefit plain-
tiffs. Under the 1992 legislation, a court could order the plaintiff to
pay fees and expenses if the court determined that the action was
commenced or maintained "without reasonable cause. 142 The leg-
islature modified this standard so that a court must find that the
action was commenced or maintained "arbitrarily, vexatiously or
not in good faith," in order to award fees and expenses to the de-
fendant.' 4 The legislature also eliminated provisions which per-
mitted a court to direct the plaintiff, at any time during a deriva-
tive suit proceeding, to post a bond representing fees the plaintiff
could be ordered to pay to the defendant. 4
138. ALLEN C. GOOLSBY, VIRGINIA CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE 82 (1992); see also
George C. Freeman III, Business and Corporate Law, 26 U. RICH. L. REv. 653, 673-75 (1992).
139. Act of Mar. 15, 1993, ch. 233, 1993 Va. Acts 233 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-
672.4, -672.5 (Repl. Vol. 1993)).
140. Id. 258 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-672.4(A)(3) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
141. Goolsby, supra note 138, at 88.
142. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-672.5(A)(2) (Cure. Supp. 1992).
143. Act of Mar. 15, 1993, ch. 233, 1993 Va. Acts 258 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
672.5(2) (Repl. Vol. 1993)).
144. Act of Mar. 15, 1993, ch. 233, 1993 Va. Acts 233 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
672.5(B) (Repl. Vol. 1993)).
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C. Limited Liability Companies
The 1993 Virginia General Assembly adopted some technical
amendments14  to Virginia's Limited Liability Company Act.146
House Bill 1787, as enacted (1) amends the procedural require-
ments for conversion of a general or limited partnership to a lim-
ited liability company, 147 (2) permits professional limited liability
companies to serve as registered agents,148 (3) changes the Profes-
sional Limited Liability Company Act to conform to the Profes-
sional Corporation Act,'49 and (4) adds limited liability companies
to the list of entities that are not entitled to plead usury as a de-
fense.1 50 In addition, the General Assembly authorized public ser-
vice companies, banking corporations, insurance corporations, sav-
ings and loan associations, credit unions, and industrial loan
associations to purchase the securities of a limited liability
company1 51
D. "Good Standing" Status of Corporations
The General Assembly revised the provisions in the Virginia
Stock and Nonstock Corporations Acts pertaining to a corpora-
tion's "good standing" status.15 2 The "good standing" statutes in
each of these Acts previously provided that a corporation was in
good standing if, among other things, it filed an annual report with
the State Corporation Commission (SCC) within the preceding
fourteen months. 53 Because of 1991 amendments to the Virginia
Stock and Nonstock Corporation Acts, each corporation is required
to file an annual report not later than the first of September of
145. Act of Mar. 10, 1993, ch. 113, 1993 Va. Acts 113 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-
330.76, 13.1-619, 13.1-634, 13.1-819, 13.1-833, 13.1-1001.1, 13.1-1002, 13.1-1005, 13.1-1010.1,
13.1-1010.2, 13.1-1011, 13.1-1015, 13.1-1023, 13.1-1038.1, 13.1-1067, 13.1-1071, 13.1-1072,
13.1-1102 (Repl. Vol. 1993)).
146. Act of Mar. 10, 1993, ch. 113, 1993 Va. Acts 114 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-
1000 to 1069 (Repl. Vol. 1993)).
147. Id. (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1010.1, 13.1-1010.2, 13.1-1067 (Repl. Vol.
1993)).
148. Id. (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-619, 13.1-634, 13.1-819, 13.1-833, 13.1-1011
(Repl. Vol. 1993).
149. Id. (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1102 ( Repl. Vol. 1993)).
150. Id. (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.76 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
151. Act of Mar. 5, 1993, ch. 61, 1993 Va. Acts 61 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §8 13.1-620,
-627 (Repl. Vol. 1993)).
152. Act of Mar. 5, 1993, ch. 60, 1993 Va. Acts 60 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §8 13.1-609,
-809 (Repl. Vol. 1993)).
153. VA. CODE: ANN. §§ 13.1-609, 13.1-809 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
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each year to avoid being terminated or having its certificate of au-
thority revoked, under prior law, a corporation that had filed an
annual report within the last fourteen months but had not filed a
current report would have been considered in "good standing"
even though it would have been terminated on September first.
The new legislation deletes the fourteen-month provision. Thus, if
a corporation's annual corporate report is not fied with the SCC
by the April 1 due date, the corporation will not be reported by
the SCC as a corporation in good standing on and after April 2,
irrespective of when the corporation's last report was fied. That
status will continue until the report is filed or the corporation is
terminated or has its certificate revoked on September first.
E. Virginia Securities Act
Under Senate Bill 731, the SCC has been given the authority to
waive the requirement that a prospectus be delivered for offers and
sales of securities registered by notification. 15 4 When securities are
first sold in an initial public offering, the issuer, as the primary
beneficiary of the sale, provides a sales prospectus furnishing key
financial information about the company. In subsequent sales of
the securities in the secondary market (non-issuer sales), the most
current information about the issuer will be found in quarterly or
annual reports. Accordingly, purchasers in the secondary market
do not ordinarily rely on the now-obsolete information contained
in the initial public offering prospectus. Nevertheless, the provi-
sions of Code of Virginia section 13.1-508 currently require broker-
154. Act of Mar. 15, 1993, ch. 179, 1993 Va. Acts 179 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
508 (Rep. Vol. 1993)). Registration by notification operates as an abbreviated process for
registering securities in Virginia. This shortened registration process is available to an issuer
that has been in continuous operation for at least five years, with no default occurring on
any securities for the past three years, and either (A) meets certain financial standards with
respect to its operations or securities offerings or (B) for securities being registered in con-
nection with a non-issuer distribution, the securities are of the same class as any securities
that have been duly registered or, alternatively, the securities were issued originally pursu-
ant to an exemption under the Virginia Securities Act (VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-507(A) (Repl.
Vol. 1993)).
The registration statement must include the following: (1) facts evidencing the eligibility
for registration by notification; (2) the amount and maximum offering price of the securities
being offered; and (3) a copy of any prospectus used in the offering. Absent the issuance of a
stop order by the SCC with respect to the offering, the registration statement automatically
becomes effective on the second full business day following the filing of the registration
statement, or at any time earlier as determined by the SCC. In connection with the offering
of securities registered by notification, the SCC may require that a prospectus detailing cer-
tain prescribed information be delivered to each person to whom an offer is made.
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dealers to furnish a prospectus in connection with any sale of a
security, making no distinction between initial public offerings and
secondary market sales.155
The new legislation authorizes the SCC to relieve broker-dealers
of the obligation to distribute a current prospectus in connection
with securities registered by notification and it is anticipated that
waivers from the prospectus may be available for secondary mar-
ket offerings. Nonetheless, the prospectus requirement for initial
public offerings is expected to remain applicable.
The SCC was also given the authority to require only the infor-
mation it deems appropriate in a registration statement filed in
connection with a registration by qualification"15 under sec-
tion 13.1-510 of the Securities Act. 157 It is anticipated that under
this new authorization, the SCC will be authorized to accept the
Small Corporate Offering Registration Form (Form U-7) for small
business applicants. Thus, registration by qualification should be
less burdensome for small businesses.
The Virginia Securities Act was also amended to provide a self-
claiming exemption from the securities registration requirements
with respect to a security issued by a Virginia church and offered
or sold only to and by its members provided they are Virginia resi-
dents and do not receive compensation, either directly or indi-
rectly, for offering or selling the security. 58 Under prior law, such
155. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.01-508 (Repl. Vol. 1993).
156. Registration by qualification, available to any security to be sold in Virginia, involves
the registration of securities through full and thorough disclosure of all material information
relating to the issuer and thesecurities offering. The registration statement, filed with the
SCC, must disclose, among other things, basic information regarding (1) the corporation and
its business; (2) the officers and directors, including information regarding any remuneration
to be received by such persons for selling the securities; (3) the capitalization and long term
debt of the issuer and any subsidiaries, including descriptions regarding any outstanding
classes of securities; (4) the terms and nature of the securities offering; (5) the estimated
cash proceeds that the issuer expects to receive; (6) a description of any outstanding stock
options; and (7) a description of all material contracts outside the ordinary course of busi-
ness. In addition, with the registration statement the following items must also be included
(1) a copy of any prospectus, sales literature or other advertisement regarding the offering;
(2) a specimen of the securities being registered; (3) an opinion of counsel as to the legality
of the securities being registered; and (4) various financial statements of the issuer. The
registration statement becomes effective only upon an order of the SCC. A prospectus de-
tailing certain prescribed information must be delivered to each person to whom an offer is
made. VA. CODE ANN. 13.1-510 (Repl. Vol. 1993).
157. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-510 (Repl. VoL 1993)).
158. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-514, -514.1 (Repl. Vol. 1993)).
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exemptions were obtained only upon filing and receiving an order
of exemption from the State Corporation Commission.
159
F. Limited Partnerships
The General Assembly made minor technical changes to the Vir-
ginia Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, including changes
relating to general partnership conversion, registered agent re-
quirements, and filing and fee requirements.16 0
IV. CONCLUSION
There were numerous significant developments in Virginia's bus-
iness and corporate law during the past year, including several Vir-
ginia circuit court opinions. Because of the wider circulation of cir-
cuit court opinions through the Virginia Circuit Court Reporter
and Virginia Law Weekly, practitioners can now look to these
courts more readily for guidance on business law issues. In addi-
tion, the 1993 General Assembly enacted several statutes which
further illustrate Virginia's commitment to remaining in the fore-
front of business law issues.
159. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-514 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
160. Act of Mar. 17, 1993, ch. 292, 1993 Va. Acts 292 (codified at V&. CODE ANN. §§ 50-
37.1, -37.3, -73.4, -73.11, -73.11:1, -73.12, -73.13, -73.15, -73.17, -73.57, -73.77 (Cum. Supp.
1993)).
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